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E x e cu t i v e  s u m m a r y 
It is likely that an increased number of migrants will arrive in 
Australia during the next decade as a result of the effects of 
environmental change in Pacific Island countries. A relatively modest 
sea-level rise may pose a threat to the very existence of Tuvalu and 
Kiribati. Natural disasters are increasing in frequency and intensity in 
Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Samoa and Vanuatu. Much of the population 
in these Pacific Island countries is youthful, and young adults tend to 
be the most mobile people. And migrants leaving their homes as a 
result of environmental change are likely to follow friends and family 
abroad, many of whom are already settled in Australia. 
It is clearly in Australia’s national interest to manage future migration, 
including environmental migration. The scale of any environmental 
migration to Australia can be reduced by supporting adaptation to 
environmental change in the affected countries. But, however effective 
these adaptation measures prove, migration to Australia from the 
Pacific Island countries as a result of environmental change is still 
likely to occur. Australia needs to plan for this in order to maximise 
the benefits, but also minimise the costs, including any increase in 
irregular migration. 
What is required is a national policy framework on environmental 
migration with three main components: continuing support for 
multilateral initiatives on environmental migration; capacity-building 
in origin and transit countries; and national legislation for 
environmental migrants arriving in Australia that leverages existing 
labour migration programs and targets a limited number of countries. 
Developing a national policy framework on environmental migration 
is not an exercise in speculation – it is managing a future challenge, 
and it is in Australia’s national interest to begin that process now. 
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Introduction 
It is likely that an increased number of migrants 
will arrive in Australia during the next decade 
as a result of the effects of environmental 
change. In the Pacific Islands, the increasing 
frequency of natural disasters, the disruption of 
agriculture by climate change, and the prospect 
of even modest sea-level rises, could displace 
hundreds of thousands of people in the worst- 
case scenario. 1 Australia is a likely destination 
for many of these people, because of 
geographical proximity, existing social 
networks, and the fact that it already has 
migration legislation that focuses on the Pacific 
such as the 2012 Seasonal Worker Scheme. It 
will be surprising if Australia does not also 
become a target for people leaving Papua New 
Guinea, which is particularly vulnerable to the 
effects of climate change, although many may 
move locally first. Even where environmental 
migration does not directly affect Australia, it 
may increase resource scarcity, contribute to 
state fragility, and even exacerbate conflict in 
parts of the world where Australian strategic, 
economic, and development interests are 
significant. 
This Analysis makes the case for developing a 
national policy framework on environmental 
migration. It does so without relying on the 
dubious science, the irresponsible manipulation 
of data, and the sheer conjecture that have 
characterised much of the global debate on 
migration and climate change in recent years. 
Neither does it depend on the unconvincing 
argument that the ‘polluter should pay’ by 
invoking the national responsibility of high- 
emission countries like Australia to bear the 
burden for the consequences of climate change. 
Instead, it makes the argument that developing 
a policy framework is in the national interests 
of Australia. 
The proposal here is for a policy framework 
that combines three main elements. The first 
element is to support current initiatives to place 
environmental migration on the multilateral 
agenda and develop an international response. 
The second is to help build capacity in 
countries that will be affected by environmental 
migration, targeting those countries that are 
likely to be origin or transit countries for 
migrants heading for Australia. The final 
element is to develop national legislation for 
environmental migrants in Australia. This can 
be limited in scope to origin countries in 
Australia’s immediate neighbourhood, and 
build on the Seasonal Worker Scheme to 
provide temporary work permits rather than 
indefinite humanitarian protection across the 
board. 
In developing the argument for a national 
policy framework, three key questions are 
addressed in this paper. First, how many 
environmental migrants can be expected in 
Australia and how soon? Second, why is it in 
Australia’s national interest to act now? And 
third, what form should a national policy 
framework on environmental migration take? 
How many and how soon? 
Many experts are understandably nervous 
about making estimates regarding 
environmental migration. The science of 
environmental change is not robust enough to 
make solid predictions, and data on 
contemporary migration are too inaccurate to 
use as a basis for forecasting. The production
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of data on climate change and migration has 
become politicised, and estimates on migration 
resulting from the effects of environmental 
change can be used to alarm rather than 
inform. Certainly, any estimate on 
environmental migration needs to be handled 
carefully. 
Nevertheless, a lack of accuracy in forecasting 
should not be a reason to avoid addressing 
what most commentators agree will become a 
substantial issue. Even at the lower end of the 
estimates that are published, environmental 
migration will take place at a scale significant 
enough, and soon enough, to merit policy 
attention now. 
The relationship between environmental change 
and migration is by no means straightforward. 
The nature of the environmental impact 
matters. There will be short-term and often 
only internal migration as a result of natural 
disasters such as tropical cyclones, heavy rains, 
and floods. Slow-onset events such as drought 
and desertification will cause more permanent 
migration. Both types of impact are predicted 
to increase significantly in the next few years 
due to climate change, although the 
relationship between climate change and 
environmental disasters remains contested. 
Migration is not an inevitable outcome – in 
many circumstances people may be able to 
adapt and stay put. Important variables will 
include poverty, social vulnerability, and the 
capacity of the government to provide 
alternatives to migration. Even where migration 
does take place, it will often be in response to 
multiple drivers. Climate change may, for 
example, be a threat multiplier and exacerbate 
disparities, reduce livelihoods, or fuel conflict 
in a country, making it hard to discern 
environmental factors from other factors in 
motivating migration. 2 And migration may 
often be internal rather than across 
international borders. 3 
In considering the future impact of 
environmental change on migration to 
Australia, particular attention has been paid to 
Tuvalu and Kiribati. The main reason is that a 
relatively modest sea-level rise, or even a major 
storm, may pose a threat to the very existence 
of these island states. 4 The environmental threat 
is compounded by inadequate land and coastal 
management in both countries. In Kiribati, one 
can add inadequate water and sanitation 
policies to the list of problems. It is possible 
that the entire populations of each country may 
at some point need to be permanently resettled. 
This is significant not just in terms of numbers 
(the population of Kiribati is about 100,000 
and of Tuvalu about 10,000). It also raises 
questions about how the sovereignty of these 
states and their citizens would be maintained in 
the absence of a territory. 
Pacific Island countries are already regularly 
affected by natural disasters, especially 
cyclones, droughts, and storm surges, and these 
too may become drivers of migration. Between 
2000 and 2011, about 300,000 people in 
Papua New Guinea were affected by natural 
disasters, almost 90,000 in Fiji, and about 
80,000 in Vanuatu. 5 Such disasters do not 
necessarily result in migration; in Samoa, for 
example, effective Disaster Risk Reduction 
(DDR) has helped mitigate the effects of 
cyclones. But in other countries these natural 
disasters have already caused significant 
displacement, although usually within the 
affected country, at least initially. The World 
Bank has reported that the number of natural
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disasters in the region is increasing 
significantly, and that the disasters are 
becoming more intense. 6 Increasing 
urbanisation, deforestation, and the destruction 
of mangrove swamps are simultaneously 
making many Pacific islands more vulnerable to 
the effects of environmental change. According 
to the Asian Development Bank, virtually all 
the island states in the Pacific are considered to 
be ‘hotspots’ of substantial environmental 
impact, with coastal areas most at risk. 7 
Estimates for the number of people predicted to 
be displaced in and from Pacific Island 
countries as a result of environmental change 
by 2050 range in one study from 665,000 to 
1,725,000. 8 
There are three reasons in particular why 
environmental change in the Pacific Island 
countries may become a factor in migration in 
the region, including to Australia. Perhaps the 
most important is that the demographic 
changes in most of these states over the next 
ten or twenty years will exacerbate the ‘youth 
bulge’ that many already face. The bulk of 
population growth to 2050 is predicted to be in 
Melanesia, and particularly Papua New 
Guinea, although significant population growth 
is also anticipated in Solomon Islands and 
Vanuatu. Young adults tend to be the most 
mobile age group and this ‘youth bulge’ is 
likely to lead to a substantial increase in the 
numbers of migrants seeking to move within 
the region. This is likely to be the case even as 
countries such as Papua New Guinea achieve 
significant economic growth. 9 
Second, much of the internal migration in 
Pacific Island countries that has occurred in the 
past few decades has moved people to cities 
that are especially vulnerable to environmental 
change. The urban poor, in particular, will feel 
the impact of environmental change, because 
they are more exposed to hazards (for example, 
in makeshift housing), live in areas that lack 
hazard-reducing infrastructure like drainage 
systems, and have less access to state assistance 
in the event of a natural disaster. ‘Stepwise’ 
migration, where rural-urban migration 
precedes an increase in international migration, 
is a widely observed phenomenon. 
Finally, there is already considerable migration 
from the Pacific Island countries to Australia, 
New Zealand and other Pacific Rim countries. 
This matters because international migration 
precipitated by the effects of environmental 
change is likely to follow existing migration 
networks, supported by migrants already 
settled in specific destination countries. Richard 
Bedford and Graeme Hugo have identified 
three distinct migration networks originating in 
the Pacific region. One is centred on Melanesia, 
from where there is already a substantial 
diaspora from Fiji; a second on Micronesia 
where Kiribati and Nauru have strong 
migration links with Australia and New 
Zealand; and a third on Polynesia where 
regional links are strongest with New Zealand. 
These migration networks have been reinforced 
by preferential migration legislation, in 
particular in New Zealand, although more 
recently in Australia also. 
Why is it in Australia’s national interest to 
respond now? 
It is clearly in Australia’s national interest to 
manage future migration. In terms of managing 
environmental migration any policy will need 
to include a number of elements.
Page 6 
A n a l y s i s 
Environmental Change and Migration 
Most obviously, the potential for 
environmental migration to Australia can be 
reduced by acting now to support adaptation to 
environmental change in the affected countries. 
Except in extreme cases such as where low- 
lying islands submerge, resulting in no option 
but to leave, migration is just one of a range of 
strategies in response to environmental change, 
and may often not be the preferred option. 
Many people may stay put and accept 
environmental change, even though their living 
standards may decline. Others may remain and 
adapt in a more active way, for example by 
building defences, changing agricultural 
practices, or adopting new livelihoods. Many 
will relocate within their countries rather than 
across national borders. The choice that people 
make between these strategies is likely to 
depend on factors such as their access to 
resources, their resilience and vulnerability, and 
their previous experience of migration. 
However effective any adaptation measures 
prove, some migration to Australia from the 
Pacific Island countries is still likely to occur. It 
is in Australia’s interest, therefore to plan now 
for that migration in order to maximise the 
benefits and minimise the costs. The 
development of a policy framework on 
environmental migration is an opportunity to 
plan well ahead of time to ensure Australia has 
as much control as possible on the number of 
migrants that may be admitted, their profile, 
the conditions of their arrival, the length of 
their stay, and the rights to which they will be 
entitled. The extent to which it may be 
appropriate to apply existing migration 
categories can be assessed in advance, and 
appropriate criteria could be applied to avoid 
concerns about ‘queue-jumping’. 
Environmental migration may even provide the 
opportunity to import required skills to 
Australia. 
One of the potential costs to Australia of not 
managing environmental migration is that it 
may increase irregular migration. The problems 
caused by irregular migration hardly need to be 
rehearsed: it undermines the exercise of 
national sovereignty, by challenging the control 
of the state over its borders and territory; it 
places a strain on public services, especially 
health and education; and it exposes vulnerable 
migrants to exploitation, and the risk of harm 
and death. Research outside Australia indicates 
that the migrant smugglers who tend to 
monopolise irregular migration are often 
associated with other crimes and can become a 
threat to public security. 10 The ongoing debate 
over unauthorised boat arrivals in Australia 
demonstrates how even a relatively small 
number of irregular migrants can undermine 
public confidence in the ability of government 
to manage migration. 
Another reason to plan for environmental 
migration from the Pacific now relates to 
Australia’s long-standing development and 
humanitarian commitment to the region. 
Environmental change already does and will 
continue to undermine livelihoods, multiply the 
challenges of urbanisation, exacerbate 
vulnerability to food and water insecurity, and 
heighten competition over scarce resources in 
affected countries. 11 Planned migration is one 
way of supporting adaptation to environmental 
change in Pacific Island countries most at risk. 12 
It can provide new livelihoods for people who 
lose land or work as a result of environmental 
change. Migrants can support those who 
remain at home through remittances. Migration 
may also alleviate pressure on resources in
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countries at risk, allowing a smaller population 
to remain there for longer. 13 
The idea that Australia should start planning 
for environmental migration is not new. In 
2006, the Labor Party proposed a Pacific Rim 
coalition to accept climate change ‘refugees’, 14 
while in 2007, Greens Senator Kerry Nettle 
proposed the Migration (Climate Refugees) 
Amendment Bill 2007. 15 In 2009, an enquiry by 
an Australian Senate Committee recommended 
a review of the legal and policy framework for 
communities forced to resettle as a result of 
environmental change. 16 
There are three reasons why it is appropriate to 
return to the idea now – although the proposal 
being made in this paper is substantially 
different from the ideas proposed, and rejected, 
in the past. One reason is that the evidence base 
for environmental migration is improving. 
While forecasting future migration will always 
be difficult, the relationship between 
environmental change and migration is far 
better understood than it was even five years 
ago. Furthermore, there is clear evidence that 
people are already being displaced from their 
homes in the Pacific Island countries as a result 
of the effects of environmental change. 17 
Second, it is striking that a number of countries 
that are far less likely than Australia to be 
directly affected by environmental migration 
have already conducted national policy reviews, 
including the United Kingdom 18 and even 
Switzerland. Closer to home, New Zealand is 
currently developing a policy on environmental 
migration. 19 Finally, there is a significant benefit 
to preparing a policy framework in advance of 
significant environmental migration, rather 
than during or after the event. Getting ahead of 
the curve is important in migration policy- 
making. 
At the same time, it is important to 
acknowledge that the current political 
environment in Australia is not conducive to 
ambitious, expensive new policies on 
migration. The proposal made in the next 
section therefore balances multilateral with 
unilateral initiatives, builds upon existing 
commitments in Australia, and provides cost- 
effective options. 
Developing a national policy framework 
on environmental migration 
The proposal here is for a national policy 
framework on environmental migration with 
three main components: continued support for 
current multilateral initiatives on 
environmental migration; capacity-building in 
origin and transit countries to cope with 
environmental migration; and the development 
of national legislation for environmental 
migrants arriving in Australia. 
Supporting multilateral initiatives 
Currently, multilateral initiatives on 
environmental migration are focusing on the 
development and consolidation of normative 
principles that can inform regional or national 
laws and policies on environmental migration. 
One example is the Nansen Principles. These 
Principles were developed at a conference co- 
hosted by the Government of Norway and 
UNHCR in Oslo in June 2011, and adopted by 
over 200 delegates, including representatives of 
UN and civil society organisations. They 
recommend building on existing norms in 
international law, and identify the
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responsibility of local, national, and 
international actors. 20 
Normative principles are important because 
they provide a basis upon which to respond to 
the protection and assistance needs of 
environmental migrants. At the moment there 
are no agreed principles for how to deal with 
migrants who cross national borders for 
environmental reasons. Indeed, there is still a 
debate about the legal status of people who lose 
their territories completely as a result of rising 
sea levels, however unlikely that eventuality 
may actually be. The direct analogy for 
developing normative principles to fill 
protection gaps is the evolution of the Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement. These 
comprise a non-binding expert document that 
has been used to lobby for national legislation 
on internal displacement in about 30 countries 
and at the regional level. 21 
The development of normative principles on 
environmental migration is a process that 
Australia is well-placed to support, given its 
experience in multilateral negotiations 
(including support for the Guiding Principles 
on Internal Displacement), and considerable 
Australia-based expertise on this topic. 
Australia has recently agreed to become a 
member of the Steering Group for the Nansen 
Principles. There are a number of things 
Australia could do in this regard. It could 
develop a comprehensive and widely accepted 
definition of environmental migration. It could 
promote collaboration between the various 
separate initiatives currently aimed at 
developing normative responses to 
environmental and other forms of ‘crisis’ or 
‘survival’ migration. It could convene a series of 
interdisciplinary and multi-stakeholder 
consultations to agree proposed norms. After 
normative principles are agreed, Australia 
could become a sponsoring state for them at 
the multilateral level. It might, for example, 
support research, training, dialogue, public 
relations, and dissemination activities to raise 
awareness of the principles; or encourage 
adherence at the UN level or among regional 
partners. 
Multilateral initiatives are not a panacea, 
however, and they would not replace, or justify 
delaying, the simultaneous development of a 
national response. In particular, beyond 
establishing normative principles, there is not 
much more that is likely to happen at a 
multilateral level on this issue. The prospects 
for a new international treaty or a protocol to 
the 1951 Refugee Convention are slim and 
have significant shortcomings. Obstacles 
include: resistance from the Office of the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
which is the guardian of the 1951 Convention, 
and its governing member states; the length of 
time it takes to negotiate international 
conventions in the field of human rights; and 
the reality that many states would refuse to 
ratify a Protocol or new Convention. 22 These 
legal and political obstacles are compounded by 
a lack of clear empirical evidence on the 
numbers of people expected to be displaced 
across borders by the effects of environmental 
change, the time horizon involved, and the 
extent to which this is likely to be a regional or 
truly global issue. 
Capacity-building in origin and transit 
countries 
Given the shortcomings of multilateral 
approaches, a second component of a national 
policy framework on environmental migration
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should focus on capacity-building in countries 
that are most likely to be affected. The most 
important element of this would be to support 
adaptation to environmental change. This is 
already identified as a priority in the Pacific 
region in the AusAID 2012-13 budget, which 
provides for an additional $384.5 million over 
four years, including to support governments 
and communities to plan for and deal with the 
effects of environmental change. 23 It is 
important that this level of commitment is 
maintained over the next decade. AusAID also 
funds the Adaptation to Climate Change 
Initiative through the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
which provides grants in the Pacific region for a 
range of projects including health, education, 
food security, agriculture and fisheries. 
Affected states should also be encouraged to 
sign up and adhere to the Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement, which provide a legal 
basis for protecting people displaced within 
their own countries by the effects of 
environmental migration. Adequate protection 
at home is one way to reduce the pressure to 
move abroad, but especially in some small 
Pacific Island countries there is simply a lack of 
capacity to focus on such medium- and long- 
term challenges. Implementing national laws 
and policies on internal displacement thus 
requires considerable capacity-building. One 
aim for capacity-building efforts is raising 
awareness of the problem of internal 
displacement; for example, through 
information and sensitisation campaigns for 
relevant authorities, including the military and 
police as well as the public. Data collection is 
another step, with the important proviso that 
such efforts should not jeopardise the security, 
protection or freedom of movement of those 
displaced. The provision of training on the 
rights of the internally displaced is also a 
necessary component, targeting government 
policy-makers at the national, regional and 
local levels, the military and the police, camp 
administrators, commissioners and staff of 
national human rights institutions, 
parliamentarians and civil society, as well as 
the displaced themselves, among others. 
National legislation 
Neither support for adaptation in origin 
countries nor capacity-building in transit 
countries will stop some environmental 
migrants trying to move to Australia, however. 
A third component of a policy framework is 
therefore to develop national legislation on 
environmental migrants. 
Three main models can be considered. One is 
to develop a new humanitarian category for 
environmental migrants. This is what was 
proposed in the Greens 2007 Bill, which called 
for a ‘climate refugee’ visa category for people 
fleeing ‘a disaster that results from both 
incremental and rapid ecological and climatic 
change and disruption, that includes sea-level 
rise, coastal erosion, desertification, collapsing 
ecosystems, fresh water contamination, more 
frequent occurrence of extreme weather events 
such as cyclones, tornados, flooding and 
drought, and that means inhabitants are unable 
to lead safe or sustainable lives in their 
immediate environment’. 24 
The Bill attracted considerable criticism in the 
Senate and did not proceed to a vote. Some 
criticisms concerned technical issues – for 
example that the proposed Bill placed too much 
responsibility for determining the criteria for 
defining a disaster and the conditions for
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admitting ‘climate refugees’ in the hands of the 
Minister. Other speakers questioned the legal 
validity of the concept ‘climate refugee’. Three 
concerns recurred in the criticisms. One was 
that Australia was already doing its fair share 
in terms of responding to climate change, and 
in terms of global migration. A second was that 
Australia should not be taking unilateral action 
on a multilateral issue. And the third was the 
financial implications of the proposal. 
Had it succeeded the Greens legislation would 
have made Australia the first country in the 
world to develop a specific visa category for 
environmental migrants, potentially making it a 
magnet for new migrants from around the 
world. There were other legitimate questions 
about what impact the creation of a new visa 
category would have on the current 
humanitarian resettlement category – would the 
quota for the latter be reduced to provide for 
the former? The fact that the legislation did not 
pass also reflected the reality that the current 
political climate on migration issues makes it 
very difficult to pass new legislation at this 
time. A second model is to amend existing 
legislation to provide temporary protection or 
refugee-like protection to environmental 
migrants. One advantage of such an approach 
is that legislative protection responses have 
already been adopted by other industrialised 
states, and so Australia would not be setting a 
precedent. 25 In the United States, Temporary 
Protected Status (TPS) was introduced as part 
of the 1990 Immigration Act to provide at least 
limited protection to people who are fleeing, or 
reluctant to return to, potentially dangerous 
situations in their home country. Between 1995 
and 1999, the status was extended to people 
from Montserrat following volcanic eruptions 
there, and more recently to Haitians following 
the 2010 earthquake. Some analysts have 
suggested that the European Union Temporary 
Protection Directive of 2001 may be interpreted 
to apply to mass influxes of people from 
natural disasters. Within the EU, Sweden and 
Finland have both amended their asylum and 
human rights laws to incorporate some element 
of ‘environmental migration’. 26 The 2005 
Swedish Aliens Act provides for the possibility 
to provide subsidiary protection on 
environmental grounds; while the Finnish 
Aliens Act of 2004 explicitly acknowledges that 
unusual environmental circumstances can 
produce mass influxes of migrants who require 
temporary protection. 
None of these examples of national policies and 
legislation is an ideal solution to the problem, 
however. TPS only applies to people already 
resident in the United States at the time of a 
natural disaster, and not to people fleeing the 
event. Invoking the EU Temporary Protection 
Directive would require agreement by a 
majority of EU Member States, which most 
commentators deem unlikely; and the focus of 
the Directive on ‘mass influxes’ would probably 
not cover most environmental migrants that 
would likely arrive in Europe (most 
environmental migrants in a European context 
would probably arrive gradually as the result of 
slow-onset events such as desertification in the 
Middle East and North Africa). Neither of the 
relevant provisions in Sweden or Finland has 
ever been tested, and there are reservations 
about how they would function in practice; for 
example, it is unclear whether the protection 
envisaged is temporary or permanent. 
This then leaves a third model that provides the 
most realistic and pragmatic approach for 
Australia to take. This would be to use existing
Page 11 
A n a l y s i s 
Environmental Change and Migration 
labour migration programs to extend migration 
opportunities to people vulnerable to or 
affected by environmental change. This is not 
without precedent. There is some debate, for 
example, about whether the New Zealand 
Pacific Access Category visa may evolve into a 
migration policy for environmental migration, 
although that is not its intention. It was 
conceived as a traditional labour migration 
program rather than an instrument for 
humanitarian protection. 27 It is based on a 
ballot system, stipulates age restrictions for 
applicants, who must have a job offer in New 
Zealand, a minimum income requirement, and 
a reasonable level of English. Furthermore, the 
scheme targets a limited number of countries 
only, and thus represents a limited response to 
environmental migration. Nevertheless, the 
scheme does target Pacific Islands at risk of 
environmental change, including Tuvalu, 
Kiribati, and Tonga, and arguably provides a 
basis for admitting people from these islands on 
environmental grounds. For example, the small 
quota could be extended, or the ballot system 
and criteria for selecting candidates revised, or 
the target countries increased, without 
significant legislative changes. 
Against this background, Australia’s new 
Pacific Seasonal Workers Scheme may provide 
a starting-point for responding to migration 
arising from the effects of environmental 
change in the Pacific Islands. Started as a pilot 
scheme in 2009 for people from Kiribati, 
Tonga, Vanuatu, and Papua New Guinea, the 
scheme has now become permanent and been 
extended to include Nauru, Samoa, Solomon 
Islands, and Tuvalu. 
No one should be under any illusions that the 
Scheme provides a comprehensive response to 
the challenge of environmental migration. First, 
at least some environmental migrants will 
require protection that is not conceived of in 
labour migration programs. Filling these 
‘protection gaps’ 28 will require some crossover 
between labour migration and humanitarian 
resettlement schemes. Second, where people are 
moving as a result of irreversible environmental 
change, for example rising sea levels, a 
permanent solution will be required, rather 
than the seasonal and temporary options 
provided in the Seasonal Workers Scheme. 
There are, however, models from elsewhere for 
facilitating the transfer of migrants employed 
on temporary labour migration schemes into 
permanent residence, based on a set of clear 
rules and criteria. 29 Third, it may be that those 
affected by environmental change do not have 
the appropriate skills for the work on offer. 
One way around this is to offer Pacific 
Islanders targeted training to develop the skills 
that are required. This could be done, for 
example, through an extension of the Australia- 
Pacific Technical College that provides 
Australian-standard skills and qualifications for 
vocational careers that are in high demand in 
Australia. There is already an Australian 
government scheme to train Kiribati nurses that 
allows them to stay in Australia to work. 
Such difficulties notwithstanding, the model of 
responding to environmental migration through 
existing labour migration programs is 
appealing. It could be achieved without 
significant new legislation or additional 
expenditure or changing institutional 
arrangements. It targets a limited number of 
countries only, defined by Australia’s national 
interest, and thus would not become a global 
magnet for environmental migration. It 
combines options for pre-empting and
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responding to the effects of environmental 
change. And for all these reasons, it is likely to 
be the most palatable of policies for public 
consumption. 
It should be said however, that adopting this 
model, or even the others discussed above, 
should be preceded by a comprehensive 
national review of environmental migration 
and its implications for Australia. The terms of 
reference for such a review would include a 
systematic evaluation of the existing data and 
evidence on the impacts of environmental 
change on migration in the region; an 
assessment of the direct and indirect 
implications of environmental migration for 
Australian national interests; an inventory of 
relevant processes and their shortcomings; 
consultations with appropriate stakeholders at 
the national and regional levels; and 
recommendations on mechanisms for 
responding to environmental migration at a 
national, regional, and international level. 
Conclusion 
Environmental migration brings together two 
of the key policy challenges facing Australia 
today. 
Significant displacement and migration 
prompted by environmental change effects in 
the Pacific Islands is a near certainty. As the 
nearest developed nation, the regional 
economic and political leader, and the hub of 
significant established migration networks with 
many of the affected countries, Australia is 
bound to become a target destination for many 
environmental migrants. 
Developing a national policy framework on 
environmental migration is not an exercise in 
speculation: it is managing a future challenge, 
and it is in Australia’s national interest. There 
are good reasons to act now, not least because 
there is no convincing multilateral response on 
the horizon. A national policy framework 
proposed need not require Australia to act 
alone. It need not make Australia a magnet for 
environmental migrants. It need not require 
significant new legislation or additional 
expenditure. It can help reduce irregular 
migration. And it may even help fill labour- 
market gaps. The opportunity for proactive and 
longer-term policy-making on migration may 
come as relief to a government that has been 
fire-fighting in recent years, and may help win 
back some public confidence in Australian 
migration policies. 
Acknowledgements 
I am grateful for research assistance in 
preparing this paper from Andonis Marsden 
and Sarah Tishler, and for very helpful 
comments on an earlier draft of this paper 
from: Anthony Bubalo, Michael Fullilove, 
Jenny Hayward-Jones, Justin Lee, Jane 
McAdam, Dougal McInnes, David McRae, 
Annmaree O’Keeffe, Claire Young, and the 
Department of Immigration and Citizenship.
Page 13 
A n a l y s i s 
Environmental Change and Migration 
NOTES 
1 Jon Barnett cited in Elizabeth Ferris, Michael 
Cernea, Daniel Petz, Brookings Institution-London 
School of Economics Project on Internal 
Displacement, On the front line of climate change 
and displacement: learning from and with Pacific 
Islands, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 
2011, p 19. 
2 UN Environment Programme, Livelihood security: 
climate change, migration, and conflict in the Sahel, 
Geneva, UNEP, 2011. 
3 For example, see Etienne Piguet, Antoine Pécoud, 
and Paul de Guchteniere, Introduction: migration 
and climate change, in Etienne Piguet, Antoine 
Pécoud, and Paul de Guchteniere (eds), Migration 
and climate change, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2011, pp 1-34. 
4 Jane McAdam, Climate change, forced migration, 
and international law, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2012, pp 123-27. 
5 EM-DAT : OFDA/CRED International Disaster 
Database, www.emdat.be. 
6 Sofia Bettencourt, Richard Croad, Paul Freeman, et 
al, Not if but when: adapting to natural disasters in 
the Pacific islands region: a policy note, Washington, 
DC, World Bank, 2006. 
7 Asian Development Bank, Addressing climate 
change and migration in the Asia and Pacific: final 
report, Manila, ADB, 2012. 
8 Jon Barnett cited in Elizabeth Ferris, Michael 
Cernea, Daniel Petz, Brookings Institution-London 
School of Economics Project on Internal 
Displacement, On the front line of climate change 
and displacement, p 19. 
9 Richard Bedford and Graeme Hugo, Population 
movement in the Pacific: review and prospect, 
Progress Report on a Joint Study for the Australian 
Department of Immigration and Citizenship and the 
New Zealand Department of Labour, presented at 
the Australian and New Zealand Immigration 
Forum, Canberra, 30 July 2008. 
10 Khalid Koser, When is migration a security issue? 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/0 
3/31-libya-migration-koser. 
11 Camillo Boano, Roger Zetter, and Tim Morris, 
Environmentally displaced people, Forced Migration 
Policy Briefing 1, Oxford, Refugee Studies Centre, 
2008. 
12 Foresight, Migration and global environmental 
change: future challenges and opportunities, 
London, Government Office for Science, 2011. 
13 Jane McAdam, Climate change, forced migration, 
and international law. 
14 Australian Labor Party, Our drowning neighbours: 
Labor’s policy discussion paper on climate change in 
the Pacific, Canberra, ALP, 2006. 
15 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 
Migration (Climate Refugees) Amendment Bill 2007. 
16 Cited in Jane McAdam, Climate change, forced 
migration, and international law, p 106. 
17 Elizabeth Ferris, Michael Cernea, and Daniel Petz, 
Brookings Institution-London School of Economics 
Project on Internal Displacement, On the front line 
of climate change and displacement. 
18 Foresight, Migration and global environmental 
change. 
19 Jane McAdam, Refusing refuge in the Pacific, in 
Etienne Piguet, Antoine Pécoud, Paul de Guchteniere 
(eds), Migration and climate change, pp 102-37. 
20 The Nansen Conference: climate change and 
displacement in the 21 st century, Oslo, Norway, June 
5-7, 2011: http://www.unhcr.org/4ea969729.pdf. 
21 Khalid Koser, Climate change and internal 
displacement: challenges to the normative 
framework, in Etienne Piguet, Antoine Pécoud, Paul 
de Guchteniere (eds), Migration and climate change, 
pp 289-305. 
22 Frank Biermann and Ingrid Boas, Preparing for a 
warmer world: towards a global governance system
Page 14 
A n a l y s i s 
Environmental Change and Migration 
to protect climate refugees, Global Environmental 
Politics 10 (1) 2010:pp 60-89. 
23 AusAID Budget 2012-13. 
24 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 
Migration (Climate Refugees) Amendment Bill 2007. 
25 Jane McAdam, Climate change displacement and 
international law: complementary protection 
standards, UNHCR Legal and Protection Policy 
Series, Geneva, UNHCR, 2011. 
26 Will Somerville, Environmental migration, 
Washington, DC, Migration Policy Institute, 2011. 
27 Jane McAdam, Environmental migration 
governance, University of New South Wales Faculty 
of Law Research Series, Paper 1, 2009. 
28 Foresight, Migration and global environmental 
change. 
29 Khalid Koser, Study of employment and residence 
permits for migrant workers in destination countries, 
International Migration Papers No. 95, Geneva, 
ILO, 2009.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr Khalid Koser is Deputy Director and Academic Dean at the Geneva Centre for Security 
Policy, and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Lowy Institute.  He is also Non-Resident Senior 
Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, Research Associate at the 
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, and Associate Fellow 
at Chatham House.  Dr Koser is chair of the UK’s Independent Advisory Group on Country 
Information.  He is editor of the Journal of Refugee Studies and on the editorial board for 
Global Governance; Ethnic and Racial Studies; Population, Space, and Place; Forced Migration 
Review; and the Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
www.lowyinstitute.org 
